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Abstract 
Conspiracy fantasy, or – to use the more common but less accurately descriptive term – 
“conspiracy theory”, is an enduring genre of discourse historically associated with 
authoritarian political movements. This article presents a literature review of research on 
conspiracy fantasy as well as two empirical studies of YouTube videos by three leading 
conspiracy fantasists. Two of these fantasists have been linked to the far right, while one 
maintains connections to figures on the far right and the far left. The first study employs 
content analysis of the ten most popular videos uploaded by each of the three, and the second 
employs corpus analysis of keywords in comments posted on all videos uploaded by the three 
fantasists.  
Jewish-related entities such as Israel, Zionists, and the Rothschild family are found to be 
among the entities most frequently accused of conspiracy in the videos. Conspiracy 
accusations against other western nations (especially the US and the UK), as well as their 
leaders and their media, were also common. Jewish-related lexical items such as “Zionist”, 
“Zionists”, “Rothschild”, and “Jews” are found to be mentioned with disproportionate 
frequency in user comments. These findings would appear to reflect the conspiracy fantasy 
genre’s continuing proximity to its roots in the European antisemitic tradition, and add 
weight to existing findings suggesting that the active YouTube audience responds to latently 
antisemitic content with more explicitly antisemitic comments.   
Keywords: Antisemitism, Antizionism, Conspiracy theories, Content analysis, Corpus 
analysis, David Icke, Right-wing extremism, Social media, User comments, YouTube 
1. Introduction  
Alongside the “blood libel” – the medieval antisemitic canard that Jews consume the blood of 
Christian children – conspiracy theory or conspiracy fantasy is argued to be one of the two 
defining themes of contemporary antisemitism (Hirsh, 2017, p. 206). It has long been 
apparent that the YouTube video-sharing platform now plays an important role in 
disseminating such fantasies (Byford, 2011, p. 11), and there is evidence that this may be 
having a discernible political effect: one recent study observed YouTube users to migrate 
towards overt white supremacist channels via channels that featured conspiracist content 
(Ribeiro, Ottoni, West, Almeida, & Meira Jr., 2018, p. 1), while another found conspiracy 
beliefs to be associated with reliance on YouTube for information (Allington, Duffy, 
Wessely, Dhavan, & Rubin, 2020; a similar effect was noted for other social media 
platforms, although it was strongest in the case of YouTube). There is thus considerable need 
to study not only the character of YouTube conspiracy fantasy but also its reception – for 
example, in comments left on the videos by members of their active audience.  
This study builds on an earlier study which focused on a single YouTube video by leading 
British conspiracy fantasist David Icke (Allington & Joshi, 2020). While that study 
established the antisemitic nature of the video in question through qualitative analysis and 
then used quantitative measures to establish the dominance of antisemitic responses in 
comments on that video, the current study was designed to generalise beyond those findings 
through study of a larger number of videos from the YouTube channels of Icke and two of his 
associates, as well as of total population of comments across all of their videos. 
The remainder of this section first defines the terms of this study before moving to review 
existing research on conspiracy fantasies, highlighting the range of social harms with which 
they have been argued to be associated. While some of those harms have been investigated 
on a quantitative level, through surveys and experiments, the repeated argument for an 
association between conspiracy fantasies and antisemitism has for the most part been made 
on an exclusively qualitative level. This study aims to contribute to knowledge by providing 
quantitative measures of antisemitism within the conspiracist culture that has grown up on 
YouTube: the world’s most popular video-sharing site. Section 2 provides a contextual 
introduction to the YouTube channels from which data were collected, while section 3 
presents an analysis of videos and section 4 presents an analysis of user comments. Findings 
in section 3 and 4 are exclusively quantitative, but visualisation and tabular summary of such 
findings is followed in each case by illustrative examples that may serve to give meaning to 
the findings by providing fuller explanation of the ways in which conspiracy accusations 
were made within the videos and of the ways in which particular lexical items were used 
within the comments. Section 5 concludes the article with a brief discussion of the 
implications. 
1.1 Definitions 
The term “conspiracy theory” comes to us from Karl Popper, who referred to the (fallacious) 
“belie[f] that institutions can be understood completely as the result of conscious design” as 
“the conspiracy theory of society” (2002 [1967], p. 168). Outside of this context, the term can 
act to obscure the distinction between rational attempts to uncover empirically real, or at least 
plausible conspiracies, and the type of discourse which is the subject of Richard Hofstadter’s 
classic essay, “The paranoid style in American politics” (1964). That distinction can be 
illustrated with two examples from US political history. President Richard Nixon was 
involved in a conspiracy to commit and then cover up the evidence of a crime. Investigation 
of that conspiracy involved the formation of theories in the sense of potential explanations of 
observed events, to be supported or refuted by further observations. By contrast, the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy by the lone gunman, Lee Harvey Oswald, has 
generated tremendous volumes of the “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and 
conspiratorial fantasy” that Hofstadter (1964, p. 77) describes. It is that genre of discourse 
that is usually intended by the term “conspiracy theory”, and its proponents are distinguished 
from genuine investigators in that – to quote a former believer – “they postulate unalterable 
conclusions in search of evidence, instead of following evidence to plausible conclusions” 
(Palmer, 2018, p. n.p.). 
To provide a clear distinction between evidence-based investigation of plausibly real 
conspiracies and our object of study in this essay – which might best be characterised as a 
sort of pseudohistory or social pseudoscience – we consider it advisable to avoid the term 
“conspiracy theory” in scholarly discourse. One credible alternative would be “conspiracy 
myth”. But in view both of Hofstadter’s repeated use of the word “fantasy”, and of the clearly 
fantastical and outlandish nature of the ideas promoted by the individuals studied in this 
article, we prefer the term “conspiracy fantasy”. 
1.2 The politics of conspiracy fantasy 
The original conspiracy fantasy, about the supposed role of the Freemasons, the Illuminati, 
and the Jews in bringing about the French Revolution, was developed and promoted by 
conservatives who mourned the Ancien Régime (Cohn, 1967, pp. 25-27). Radicals soon 
developed a rival conspiracy fantasy about the supposed role of the Jesuits in frustrating the 
Revolution (Cubitt, 1993). And the Republic itself came to use a conspiracy fantasy about 
Peter the Great in order to justify war with Russia (Groh, 1987). Moreover, it was agents of 
the Russian Tsar who gave the first of these three fantasies its definitive form in the 
virulently antisemitic, heavily plagiaristic, and spectacularly successful forgery known as The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Cohn, 1967, pp. 103-107).  
Conspiracy fantasy has been important to totalitarian regimes: the ideology of the Austro-
German Nazi regime was built around the idea of a Jewish world conspiracy (Cohn, 1967; 
Herf, 2008 [2006]), and the Soviet Communist regime promoted a near-identical myth, 
departing from it in that “the ethnic category of ‘the Jew’ was replaced with a political one, 
[the] ‘Zionist’” (Byford, 2011, p. 63). Would-be totalitarians have also employed conspiracy 
fantasy. The Protocols were distributed both by the British Union of Fascists and by the 
Britons (Holmes, 1979, p. 156), with closely derivative fantasies being authored by Nesta 
Webster (1925), who had great intellectual influence on the far right (see Lee, 2005), and by 
A.K. Chesterton (1965), the founder of the National Front (see Hanna, 1974). Today, 
conspiracy fantasies are near-ubiquitous on the British extreme right (HOPE not hate, 2019b, 
p. 12). 
Anti-democratic regimes remain heavily associated with belief in conspiracy fantasies. Long 
before he installed himself as Supreme Leader of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini became 
“convinced that the central political theme of contemporary life was an elaborate and highly 
complex conspiracy by the Jews” (Taheri, 1986, p. 159). Since Khomeini’s death, the Tehran 
regime has disseminated the Protocols at home and abroad (Küntzel, 2012, p. 247), and the 
country’s sixth president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was a particularly enthusiastic propagator 
of such fantasies: 
[Ahmadinejad] says, “Two thousand Zionists want to rule the world.” He says, “The 
Zionists” have for sixty years now blackmailed “all western governments.” “The Zionists 
have imposed themselves on a substantial portion of the banking, financial, cultural and 
media sectors.” “The Zionists” fabricated the Danish Muhammad cartoons. “The 
Zionists” are responsible for the destruction of the dome of the Golden Mosque in Iraq. 
(Küntzel, 2012, p. 249) 
The Serbian nationalist invoked antisemitic conspiracy fantasies (Byford & Billig, 2001), 
while the authoritarian military regime in Egypt has used conspiracy fantasies in order “to 
accuse autonomous civil society of serving foreign governments’ agendas” (Hamzawy, 2018, 
p. 494). In the Russian Federation, the collapse of the (heavily conspiracist) Soviet regime 
has led to further institutionalisation of conspiracy fantasy, although such fantasies tend to be 
disseminated less by senior politicians than by “Kremlin-loyal intellectuals, book publishers, 
and the media” (Yablokov, 2018, p. 362). Moreover, the Kremlin regime actively promotes 
conspiracy fantasy through its international propaganda vehicles, especially RT (formerly, 
Russia Today) and the Sputnik news agency. Sputnik has been argued to target Anglophone 
social media users with conspiracist content designed to encourage the emergence of 
populist, anti-establishment political movements (Watanabe, 2018, pp. 23-24), while RT, 
demonstrably functioning “an instrument of state defence policy [which is used] to meddle in 
the politics of other states” (Elswah & Howard, 2020, p. 623), has been argued to incorporate 
conspiracy fantasies in its regular programming as part of an editorial strategy centred around 
“the denial of the very possibility of objective, verifiable truth” (Richter, 2017, pp. 13, 37, 
10). Interviews with current and former RT employees confirm that the promotion of 
conspiracy fantasies about western media organisations is one of the channel’s three core 
goals (Elswah & Howard, 2020, p. 630). 
1.3 The psychology of conspiracy fantasy 
1.3.1 The correlates of conspiracy belief 
Goertzel found that survey respondents who believed in one conspiracy fantasy were likely to 
believe in others, indicating that such fantasies may form a “generalised ideological 
dimension” or “monological belief system” associated with feelings of anomie (1994, pp. 
735, 740, 736-737). Similarly, generic conspiracist assumptions have been found to predict 
belief in a wide array of specific conspiracy theories (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). 
Among undergraduates, it has been found that specific conspiracy beliefs are associated with 
anomie, authoritarian inclinations, low self-esteem, and feelings of powerlessness, while a 
general conspiracist outlook is associated with mistrustfulness, hostility, and an external 
locus of control (Abalakina-Paap & Stephan, 1999).  
Conspiracist beliefs about the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 appear to be associated 
with political cynicism, political alienation, openness to experience, and disagreeableness 
(Swami, Chamorri-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010, p. 752), while general conspiracist beliefs 
share many correlates with paranoia and are associated with multiple psychiatric diagnoses, 
as well as with poverty, ethnic minority status, and lower levels of education (Freeman & 
Bentall, 2017). Conspiracist beliefs also correlate with Machiavellianism and with 
willingness to participate in conspiracies, which suggests that they may involve projection 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2011). 
1.3.2 Conspiracy theory and political action 
There is evidence that conspiracy beliefs may influence individual action. In one study, 
viewing the conspiracist movie JFK was found to be associated with reduced likelihood to 
vote, to donate money, or to volunteer for political activities (Butler, Koopman, & Zimbardo, 
1995). Exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy literature has been found to reduce intention to 
vaccinate children, as well as to reduce trust in authorities and increase feelings of 
powerlessness and disillusionment (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a), while exposure to 
governmental conspiracy fantasies has been found to reduce intentions to engage in politics, 
and exposure to climate change conspiracy fantasies has been found to reduce intentions to 
lessen carbon emissions (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). Many studies have found an association 
between conspiracy beliefs and resistance to public health advice (Allington et al., 2020; 
Dunn et al., 2017; Goertzel, 2010; Grebe & Nattrass, 2011; Thorburn & Bogart, 2005; 
Zimmerman et al., 2005).  
Some scholars have argued that the “conspiratorial mindset” is “politically corrosive”, with 
the potential to cause withdrawal from politics, threats of violence, and scapegoating 
(Muirhead & Rosenblum, 2016, p. 74). A series of studies found a “conspiracy mentality” to 
be associated not only with prejudice against groups perceived to powerful, but also with a 
tendency to blame those groups for problems and a willingness to take action against them 
(Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). Moreover, belief in conspiracy fantasies has been found to predict 
low-level criminal behaviour, and exposure to conspiracist discourse has been found to 
increase intentions to commit crime (Jolley, Douglas, Leite, & Schrader, 2019). 
1.3.3 Conspiracy fantasy as discourse 
Conspiracy fantasy exhibits a considerable degree of homogeneity and continuity, which has 
been explained in terms of the cognitive function of conspiracist assumptions (Grewal, 2016; 
van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). Another explanation lies in conventionality. As Byford 
emphasises, “conspiracy writers tend to interpret the world around them through the work of 
other conspiracy theorists”, and “the main criterion for a successful conspiracy theory is that 
it is recognised as such by the wider community of conspiracy enthusiasts, who will judge it 
… according to whether it echoes the motifs and arguments of the conspiracy tradition” 
(2011, p. 102). Perhaps the most notable of the tradition’s continuities has been the central 
place that it accords Jewry – and especially the famously Jewish Rothschild family. Billig 
argues that it is conspiracy fantasists’ reliance on the work of earlier generations of 
conspiracy fantasists that has entrenched what he calls “[t]he folklore about Jewish 
communists and Jewish financiers” (1978, p. 340). 
2. Context for the data 
The current study focuses on YouTube channels belonging to David Icke, Richie Allen, and 
Ken O’Keefe. These conspiracy fantasists were chosen because of their prominence and their 
history of association with one another, with the three arguably constituting a specific 
“movement” in the production of conspiracist culture, in some ways comparable to a literary 
movement. All three were involved in The People’s Voice: an online “television channel” 
devoted to conspiracy fantasies and directed by Icke, with individual shows presented by 
Allen, O’Keefe, and others. Although The People’s Voice was short-lived, it successfully 
raised £435 248 in donations via the Indiegogo crowdfunding platform (TPV, 2013, 2014a, 
2014b). 
Table 1 presents indicators of success for the YouTube channels as of 5 September 2018. 
Allen’s channel had then been online for barely half a year, although Allen (2018b) claimed 
that videos on his (deleted) original channel had received over 20 million views. 
2.2 The three conspiracy fantasists 
2.2.1 David Icke 
Icke is a former television presenter and political spokesperson. Author Alice Walker has 
stated that she kept his book And the Truth shall set you Free on her nightstand and that “[i]n 
Icke’s books, there is the whole of existence” (NYT, 2018, p. BR7); some years earlier, she 
said that “the book she would take with her as a castaway was Icke’s Human Race Get Off 
Your Knees: The Lion Sleeps No More” (Independent, 2013, p. 20). Other high-profile 
enthusiasts include rock musicians Matt Bellamy (Loundras, 2006) and Mick Fleetwood 
(BBC, 2018a), as well as comedian Frankie Boyle (Boyle, 2013; Icke, 2016b). But as Barkun 
writes, Icke has “clearly sought to cultivate the extreme right” (2003, p. 107), and has 
repeatedly endorsed the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Barkun, 2003, pp. 103-104, 146-
147). Icke also helped to launch Red Ice – a now-deleted white supremacist YouTube 
channel – by contributing a series of videos (Prentice, 2018). In 2019, a number of Icke’s 
videos were deleted for violation of YouTube’s revised hate speech policies (Allington & 
Joshi, 2020, pp. 38, 40), and in 2020, the UK communications regulator sanctioned the 
broadcaster ESTV after its London Live channel aired an interview with Icke which it judged 
to have “the potential to cause significant harm to viewers in London during the Coronavirus 
crisis” (Ofcom, 2020, p. 16). The interviewer, YouTube personality Brian Rose, subsequently 
launched a fundraising drive centred around a livestreamed conversation between himself and 
Icke; it raised $117313 in the first 24 hours (CCDH, 2020, p. 14). After a high-profile 
campaign by the Center for Countering Digital Hate, Icke’s YouTube channel was eventually 
deleted for violation of the platform’s policy on harmful disinformation (BBC, 2020). 
Icke’s fantasies characteristically include science-fictional elements, notably the idea that the 
earth is secretly controlled by shape-shifting reptilian aliens who drink the blood of blonde-
haired, blue-eyed children. This is an obvious echo of the blood libel – and Icke often 
identifies the Rothschild family as reptiles with this gruesome supposed predilection. A 
further distinguishing feature of Icke’s discourse is its highly sexualised nature, with child 
rape and abuse a recurring theme. Byford argues that Icke’s repetitive allegations of child 
abuse and child sacrifice have “an ideological link… with the medieval antisemitic 
demonology in which motifs of ritualistic child abuse were all-pervading” (2011, p. 76). The 
following is a typical example, dealing with two of Icke’s regular targets, i.e. the Rothschild 
family and the British royal family: 
Anthony Blunt’s reward for services rendered in hiding the Nazi truth about the 
Windsor-Mountbattens was to be appointed Surveyor of the King’s Pictures when he 
retired from MI5 after the war – even though he was still a member of the Rothschild spy 
ring … 
 
… 
 
The Windsors would have also known that Blunt was a paedophile and … stories have 
long circulated about his procurement of young boys, mostly from “care” homes, and his 
paedophile parties. 
 
These include how Blunt would murder children through asphyxiation while they were 
being raped because of the apparent sexual “high” these sickest of people get from this. 
One rapist would be a masked man said to be a royal or a Rothschild (same thing) who 
always wore socks even when otherwise naked. He became known as the “Soxon 
Rothschild”. 
(Icke, 2013, p. n.p.) 
In the above, Icke embellishes the baseless but longstanding Elm Guest House conspiracy 
fantasy, which led to a massive police investigation and to the public vilification of several 
innocent people (Hermann, 2020). Although Icke’s descriptions of imaginary sex crimes are 
unusually graphic, essentially similar accusations form a thread within contemporary 
conspiracist culture. Hofstadter writes as follows: 
The enemy is … a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral superman – sinister, 
ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving. … 
 
[T]he sexual freedom often attributed to the enemy, his lack of moral inhibition, his 
possession of especially effective techniques for fulfilling his desires, give exponents of 
the paranoid style an opportunity to project and express unacknowledgeable aspects of 
their own psychological concerns. 
(Hofstadter, 1964, p. 85) 
2.2.2 Richie Allen 
Richie Allen is an online radio host based in Greater Manchester. His guests have included 
the Holocaust denier Nick Kollerstrom and the white nationalist YouTuber, Lana Lokteff, as 
well as the Holocaust-denying musician, Alison Chabloz (HOPE not hate, 2019a), and a 
number of less marginal political figures. On the left, these have included former back-bench 
MP George Galloway (Allen, 2017), and Kerry-Anne Mendoza (Allen, 2017 [2016]), the 
owner of leading alt-left site The Canary. On the right, former front-bench Conservative MP 
and current Brexit Party MEP Ann Widdecombe has appeared three times, while Brexit Party 
MEP David Bull has appeared once and Brexit Party parliamentary candidate Stuart Waiton 
has appeared six times (HOPE not hate, 2019a). The data collected for this study relate to 
Allen’s second YouTube channel, which was founded in February 2018, just over a week 
after his original channel was deleted for policy violations. 
Allen often treads a fine line, giving his interviewees space in which to make dangerous 
claims but withholding explicit endorsement. For example, HOPE not hate describes his 
interview with Lokteff as follows: 
Allen and Lokteff debated the conspiracy theory of “white genocide”, the notion that 
sinister elites are plotting to reduce the white European population. Whilst disagreeing 
with Lokteff on her views on racial identity and belief in a “Jewish conspiracy”, during 
the course of their discussion, Allen repeatedly praises her for her intelligence, 
repeatedly states [that] he does not consider her to be racist, and praises her [YouTube 
show] as “very important[”] [as well as saying] [“]long may it continue[”]. 
(2019a, p. n.p.) 
On other occasions, Allen appears to attempt to lead interviewees to make controversial 
statements. A good example is provided by Allen’s interview with Michael Shrimpton, which 
largely focuses on the poisoning of Yulia and Sergei Skripal: an event which Shrimpton 
blamed on the long-defunct Nazi-era German intelligence service known as the Deutsche 
Verteidigungs Dienst or DVD. Reports in the legacy media describe Shrimpton as a 
convicted sex offender who received a custodial sentence for wasting police time with false 
claims of a “DVD” plot to detonate a stolen nuclear bomb (O’keeffe, 2015; Robertson, 2018). 
However, Allen makes no mention of this context, instead allowing Shrimpton to pose as an 
expert on intelligence issues and apparently attempting to steer him towards the canard that 
the Rothschild family was behind the Russian revolution: 
Shrimpton: You’ve got to be careful with the KGB because they were heavily penetrated 
by the DVD, who set up Russian intelligence after the Bolshevik Revolution, which of 
course was bankrolled from Germany in order to get Russia out of World War Two, in 
order to f- World War One rather, in order to free up German troops to launch the spring 
offensive in 1918 in the west 
 
Allen (interrupting): And by the way, I’ll take you to a cricket match, if it’s not this 
summer, next summer, at Old Trafford, I’ll take you to a cricket match, and you can tell 
me privately, we’re not talking about the Germans here, we’re talking about the 
Frankfurt Rothschilds 
(Allen, 2018a) 
2.2.3 Ken O’Keefe 
A former US Marine, O’Keefe began in environmental activism. However, he has spoken at 
the Freedompalooza festival (O’Keefe, 2017a), whose organiser was described as “an 
antisemite and [an] anti-government extremist” by the ADL (2013, p. n.p.), as well as at the 
London Forum (SPLC, 2015): an “organising hub… for the British far-right” founded by an 
ex-soldier (Poulter, 2018, p. n.p.) who was later jailed for inciting violence against Jews 
(BBC, 2018b). O’Keefe’s channel was eventually deleted by YouTube, probably as part of 
the purge of white supremacist content which took place in the summer of 2019 (though see 
ADL, 2019 on the incomplete nature of this purge; YouTube, 2019). 
O’Keefe is a familiar face both on RT (see section 1.2, above) and on the Iranian English-
language propaganda channel, PressTV. Although O’Keefe uses branding featuring the 
phrase “Truth Justice Peace”, his address to the London Forum makes clear that he is not a 
pacifist: 
Fuck peace in this world. Fuck that shit, I’d rather die. I’d rather kill some of these 
bastards that are trying to destroy this world and take control of everything. Fuck you. 
I’d rather die. 
(O'Keefe quoted in SPLC, 2015, p. n.p.) 
O’Keefe achieved mainstream media attention in 2017 after the now-notorious Palestine Live 
Facebook group was infiltrated by researcher David Collier. O’Keefe was a participant in the 
Gaza Freedom Flotilla of 2010, along with Free Gaza Movement spokesperson Greta Berlin. 
Responding to praise of O’Keefe from other members of Palestine Live, Berlin stated that the 
Israeli commandos who stormed the flotilla had only opened fire after O’Keefe had wrested a 
weapon from one of them, which meant that he was “responsible for some of the deaths on 
board the Mavi Marmara” (Berlin quoted in Philpot, 2018, p. n.p.). 
Other conspiracy fantasists have sometimes accused O’Keefe of impropriety in his 
fundraising activities (e.g. Allen, 2018c; Igan, 2016; Zionist Report, 2019). O’Keefe strongly 
denies these allegations. For example, in a monologue in which he also stated that the US is 
“totally run by Jewish supremacist Talmudic paedophile Satanic bankster cultists”, O’Keefe 
argued that his accusers cannot know whether or not he has embezzled any money, stating “I 
control the money, so the hundred K that was raised … I know exactly what’s left, and these 
people who are accusing me, they don’t know shit” (O’Keefe, 2017b). 
3. Content analysis of videos 
Given the repeated scholarly finding that conspiracy fantasies have historically tended to 
centre around accusations against Jews (see section 1, above), it was expected that conspiracy 
accusations against Jewish and Jewish-related entities (individual or collective) would be 
found to feature prominently in popular videos by the three conspiracy fantasists focused on 
here (relative to other themes observed in the same videos). The first research question was 
therefore as follows: 
RQ1. How frequently are conspiracy accusations made against entities of various 
types in popular videos by Icke, Allen, and O’Keefe? 
Given this study’s focus on antisemitism, the principal interest of these research questions is 
in the answers with regard to Jewish entities. But in the interest of transparency, findings will 
be reported for all of the most frequently-accused entities. 
3.1 Methodology 
Content analysis is a research method for identifying recurrent themes in messages of any 
kind (for an introduction, see Neuendorf, 2017 [2002]). It involves making systematic 
observations of the presence or absence of particular themes, and then treating those 
observations as data for statistical analysis. It is used here because it enabled YouTube videos 
to be treated as multimodal texts, with observations being made directly rather than on a 
transcription.  
Conspiracy accusations made in the 30 videos were identified through quantitative content 
analysis. The initial coding process was carried out between 7 September and 8 October 2018 
by one researcher in close consultation with the lead researcher. The top ten videos by 
popularity were selected via the YouTube page for each channel, and then streamed via the 
YouTube website, with notes being taken on each video on a flexible electronic form 
implemented as an Excel sheet. An initial list of potentially accused conspirators were 
identified by the two researchers together on the basis of (a) general impressions formed from 
viewing a range of videos by the three conspiracy fantasists and (b) careful joint viewing of 
the single most popular video on each channel. The researcher was then able to add further 
conspirators as and when accusations against them were observed in the remaining videos. 
The initial form agreed by both researchers contained 26 entities often accused of conspiracy, 
e.g. “Freemasons”, “Israel”, the “Deep State”, the “mainstream media” (or MSM), etc. By the 
end of data collection, there were 34 (all of which had been observed in the dataset). 
Accusations against entities were coded as either present or absent in each video. It would not 
have been possible to produce a meaningful measure of inter-rater reliability because of (a) 
the complexity of the coding scheme, and (b) the small number of observations (a necessary 
consequence both of the complexity of the task and of the great length of many of the videos, 
which was in some cases over an hour). Because there was no use of random sampling, 
statistical inference is neither necessary nor meaningful. Rather, the findings of this part of 
the analysis are to be treated as descriptive statistics with regard to the coding of a highly 
specific population: the 10 most popular videos by each of three specific conspiracy 
fantasists. 
3.2 Findings 
3.2.1 Frequency of accusations 
Table 2 and Figure 1 show the number of top 30 videos within which each entity was accused 
of conspiracy (entities accused in less than five were excluded). Israel and the US were most 
frequently accused, with each being mentioned in 18 of the 30. Zionists and the Rothschild 
family featured as conspirators in seven and eight videos respectively. The UK featured as a 
conspirator in 11 videos, and the European Union in eight, with specific western politicians 
being accused in nine videos. The expectations with which this study began are thus fulfilled 
with regard to Jewish and Jewish-related conspirators. But western countries and their leaders 
are also found to be a frequent target of accusations. It is noted that the specific western 
politicians most commonly mentioned are Benjamin Netanyahu, Barrack Obama, Donald 
Trump, and Theresa May, which means that these accusations effectively amount to further 
or parallel accusations against the Israel, the US, and the UK. Leaders of these countries’ 
strategic adversaries are not accused of conspiracy. It is further noted the “mainstream 
media” accused of complicity is invariably the commercial and public service media of 
western democratic nations, and not the state-controlled media of e.g. Russia, China, or Iran. 
3.2.2 Illustrative examples 
For illustrative purposes, we shall now briefly discuss the top video from each of the three 
channels. At the time of writing, all three were still available on YouTube. 
The most popular video on Icke’s channel was an extract from a public lecture entitled 
“Agenda 21, The Plan To Kill You - David Icke” (Icke, 2016a). As of the time of data 
collection, this video had accumulated 2 767 266 views, 29 621 likes, and 2 050 dislikes. In 
his lecture, Icke details a multitude of conspiracies relating to concepts such as weather 
control, genetic modification, vaccines, and war, and alleges them to have been perpetrated 
by a bewildering range of entities, including Bill Gates, the World Health Organisation, and 
the Fabian Society. Icke repeatedly presents the US, the UK, and their allies as a threat both 
to world peace and to the individual safety of his listeners. By contrast, their strategic 
adversaries are presented as innocent targets of aggression and propaganda. For example, a 
slide supposedly listing “Countries attacked by bombing, sabotage, or attempted government 
overthrow since World War Two” features two columns: one labelled “USA” which featured 
a list of over 50 countries, and one labelled “Iran” which was (absurdly) left completely 
blank. Towards the end of the video, Icke speaks for over seven minutes about “Rothschild 
Zionism”, which he describes as “a secret society created and instigated and controlled by the 
Rothschilds”, whom he presents as controlling both Israel and the US, and as conspiring 
simultaneously to carry out a genocide of Palestinians and to initiate World War III (see 
Allington & Joshi, 2020 for detailed analysis of Icke's use of the term "Rothschild Zionism", 
and of the ways in which his YouTube audience interprets and responds to it; Icke later began 
using the more obscure but still racially-charged term "Sabbatean Frankist" as an alternative, 
CCDH, 2020, p. 10). 
The most popular video on Allen’s channel was an interview entitled “Michael Shrimpton 
“The Novichok Agent Used On The Skripal’s DID Come From Porton Down Lab!’” (Allen, 
2018a). As of the time of data collection, this video had accumulated 23 461 views (likes and 
dislikes were disabled). A quotation from the interview has already been presented above 
(section 2.2.2). In the video, Allen’s guest makes unsupported assertions to the effect that the 
chemical weapons attack on Sergei and Yulia Skripal was carried out not by Russian security 
forces but by the “DVD” using a nerve toxin provided by the UK government’s Defence 
Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down in the south of England. As we have 
already seen, Allen contributed his own conspiracy accusation against the Rothschild family, 
implying that it was the real power behind Shrimpton’s imaginary “DVD”. 
The most popular video on O’Keefe’s channel was entitled “Libya & Gaddafi - The Truth 
you are not supposed to know” (O’Keefe, 2011). As of the time of data collection, this video 
had accumulated 370 413 views, 5 080 likes, and 212 dislikes. It consists of low-quality 
footage of Col. Muammar Gaddafi touring a city in an open top vehicle, with a series of pro-
Gaddafi propaganda claims presented through overlaid text. These include conspiracy fantasy 
elements, such as the accusation that the rebels who overthrew Gaddafi replaced Libya’s 
central bank with one that was “owned by Rothschild, just as ours in the west are”. The video 
was not unique to O’Keefe’s channel and there is no evidence that he was its creator. 
4. Corpus analysis of comments 
Corpus analysis is the statistical analysis of text data (for an introduction, see Brezina, 2018). 
It is used here because it permitted analysis of the whole population of comments on all 
videos by the three conspiracy theorists, without the need for comments to be individually 
read, and therefore without the need for sampling (YouTube comments take the form of 
digital text and do not need to be transcribed).  
Given the aforementioned qualitative finding that accusations against Jews have been 
historically central to conspiracist culture (see section 1, above), it was expected that Jewish-
related lexis would be found to feature prominently in comments on videos by the three 
conspiracy fantasists (relative both to other lexis and to usage in a representative corpus of 
comparable texts). The second research question was therefore as follows: 
RQ2. Relative to their usage in public online English-language texts, which lexical 
items are most over-used in comments on videos by Icke, Allen, and O’Keefe? 
From the point of view of the current study, the principal interest of this research question is 
with regard to Jewish-related lexis. However, findings will be reported for all of the most 
over-used lexical items. 
4.1 Methodology 
Comments on all videos uploaded to the three YouTube channels were collected on 6 July 
2018 via the YouTube API. The number of comments collected by this means was smaller 
than the total reported number of comments for all videos: an anomaly for which no 
explanation is available, because the API is undocumented (see below). A reference corpus 
had been collected on 28 April 2017 via the Twitter microblogging platform’s Sample 
Tweets API, which provides a random sample of tweets (original messages) and retweets (re-
circulated messages) in real time. Retweets were excluded in order to avoid biasing the 
sample towards popular tweets, and tweets not recognised by Twitter as being in the English 
language were also excluded. Altogether, just over one million tweets were collected. The 
possibility of a reference corpus of YouTube comments was ruled out on the grounds that the 
API does not facilitate random sampling. Although arising on a platform with different 
technical affordances and restrictions (Twitter’s hashtags and limit on message length have 
no YouTube equivalent), the Twitter reference corpus can plausibly be treated as a 
representative sample of short digital messages in the English language. 
Just under half of each sub-corpus by number of words was taken from comments of over 
100 words in length, even though these accounted only for about one comment in ten. It was 
recognised that these longer comments might potentially bias the findings if their lexical 
content was unrepresentative of the more numerous shorter comments. Thus an additional 
corpus was created by filtering out all comments which were over 100 words long, and the 
analysis below was repeated using this smaller corpus. Findings are almost identical, but are 
presented below for the sake of transparency. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for each 
of the three sub-corpora (both in the full corpus and in the smaller corpus within which 
comments were limited to a maximum of 100 words), as well as in the reference corpus. 
Table 4 and table 5 provide more detail by presenting mean numbers of comments and words 
per commenter (respectively), as well as the standard deviations, quartiles, and 10th and 90th 
centiles for numbers of comments and words. As noted above, total number of comments 
collected fell below the reported totals for the three channels, hence the discrepancies 
between some numbers in these tables and their equivalents in table 1. The sheer numbers of 
commenters – thousands of individual YouTube users for Allen and O’Keefe’s channels, and 
tens of thousands for Icke’s – by themselves stand as a remarkable testament to the impact of 
these conspiracy fantasists. 
Analysis of comments began with identification of keywords, defined as lexical words that 
were used more frequently than expected, given their frequencies in the reference corpus (see 
Dunning, 1993 for an influential articulation of this approach). Stopwords and lexis directly 
relating to the three conspiracy fantasists and their branding were removed (including mis-
spellings of the fantasists’ names). All digits were removed, except in strings denoting the 
2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, all of which were retained in a single 
standard form, “911”. Lexemes were not lemmatised. For each channel, the 500 most 
common remaining lexemes were selected. The frequency of each in the corpus of comments 
associated with a single channel was then compared with its frequency in a million-tweet 
reference corpus prepared in the same way, and expressed as an estimated odds ratio, with a 
95% confidence interval for the true odds ratio being calculated using Fisher’s exact test (see 
Fisher, 1962). The odds ratio is a measure of effect size, unlike the more standard corpus 
linguistic metric of log-likelihood. Thus, this part of the study follows “new statistics” best 
practice in reporting confidence intervals and estimated effect sizes rather than test statistics 
such as log-likelihood or Chi-square, or p-values derived from such test statistics (Cumming, 
2014). 
In order to protect the analysis from domination by the channel with the most comments, 
each word was then given a score according to its ranking in each list by odds ratio, with 500 
points for the word with the highest rank, 499 for the word with the second-highest, and so 
on. The three lists were then combined, with the 30 highest-scoring words being treated as 
keywords (only the top 15 are reported below, for reasons of space). 
4.2 Findings  
4.2.1 Frequency of keywords 
Table 6 and figure 2 show the top 15 keywords, with frequencies per 100 000 words in the 
reference corpus and in comments on each of the three channels, as well as estimates and 
95% confidence intervals for the odds ratios. These are arranged by score based on their 
ranking across the three corpora. As we see, the top four keywords overall were “Zionist”, 
“Zionists”, “Rothschild”, and “Jews”, with “governments” and “controlled” coming in fifth 
and sixth place, and “Jewish” and “Israel” coming in seventh and eighth. Thus, six out of the 
top ten keywords were Jewish-related: a clear indication either (a) that audiences tend to 
respond to such conspiracy fantasies by talking about Jews or (b) that those with a pre-
existing inclination to talk about Jews tend to gravitate towards conspiracy fantasies. Odds of 
encountering each of the top six are estimated to be between a few tens and several hundred 
times greater in each of the three comment corpora than in general online English-language 
discourse; even for the seventh- and eighth-from-top, the odds are estimated to be 19.31 and 
16.68 times greater in comments on Icke’s videos, 40.65 and 36.87 times greater in 
comments on Allen’s videos, and 68.01 and 106.24 times greater in comments on O’Keefe’s 
videos (respectively). The expectations with which this study began are thus fulfilled with 
regard to Jewish-related lexical items. The lexis whose presence most sets comments on these 
videos apart from English-language online messages in general would indeed appear to be 
overwhelmingly Jewish in association. (For comparison, “Muslims” was the thirtieth-from-
top keyword, and other religious or ethnic groups do not feature at all in the top thirty.) Odds 
ratios for the three sub-corpora are very similar across the top 15 keywords, supporting the 
view that the corpora represent a common conspiracist culture. However, there are some 
exceptions. In particular, odds ratios for “Zionist”, “Zionists”, “Jews”, “Jewish”, and “Israel” 
(that is, all of the Jewish-related lexemes in the top 15, other than “Rothschild”, odds ratios 
for which were similar across the three corpora) were all noticeably higher for O’Keefe’s 
channel: a finding that may reflect O’Keefe’s very overt antisemitism and pro-Hitler stance 
(see section 2.2.3, above). 
Table 7 is the equivalent of table 5 for the corpus from which comments of over 100 words 
were excluded. It is presented for the sake of transparency. There are some differences in the 
order of keywords, but the general picture is essentially the same: indeed, seven (rather than 
six) of the top ten keywords are Jewish-related (“Zionism”, “Zionist”, “Zionists”, 
“Rothschild”, “Jews”, “Israel”, and “Jewish”). This supports the view that including the 
minority of very long comments did not bias the findings presented above: a fixation on 
Jewish themes is characteristic of comments on the videos in general, and not merely of 
longer comments. 
4.2.2 Illustrative examples 
It should not be assumed that the words “Zionist” and “Zionists” necessarily refer to a 
political ideology, while “Rothschild” necessarily refers to a family of real individuals, and 
“Jews” necessarily refers to a real-world ethno-religious group. Rather, all four function 
semi-interchangeably to invoke the same fundamental fantasy. Whichever of these words is 
used by commenters, we find variations on the core idea that the world has been taken over 
by Zionists, or by Jews, or perhaps by people who are masquerading as Jews, or by a family 
that is almost universally associated with Jewishness, or even – as one commenter put it – by 
a “Khazarian-Ashkenazi-Illuminati-Masonic above 3°-Rothschild-Zionist-Babylonian 
Talmud following- paedophile-Satan worshipping cabal of fake Jews”. Without carrying out 
an additional content analysis of comments (as in Allington & Joshi, 2020), there is no 
feasible way to discuss a sample of comments large enough to be considered representative. 
However, to mitigate against any temptation to “cherry-pick” evidence, all examples 
discussed in this section (including the example already quoted in this paragraph) are drawn 
from a small sample of comments consisting of three randomly-selected comments per 
channel featuring each of the top four keywords (N = 36). 
Several of those comments engage in Holocaust denial, or suggest that Jews, Zionists, or the 
Rothschild family either have some responsibility for the Holocaust or have committed 
crimes worse than the Holocaust. Multiple non-Jewish entities are accused of conspiring with 
Zionists or Jews to control or destroy the world. One comment accuses the Jesuit order of 
being “Crypto-Jewish” and of aiming “to destroy Europe through revolutions” (a change 
from 19th century fantasies of Jews conspiring to cause revolution and Jesuits conspiring to 
frustrate it; see section 1.2, above). Multiple political leaders are presented as being under 
Jewish, Israeli, or Rothschild control. Indeed, the implication at times appears to be that the 
US and other democratic countries are totally enslaved: one commenter refers to them as 
“[t]he Western Rothschild nations”, for example. 
A number of commenters appear to propose extremist solutions to the imaginary Jewish 
problem. For example, one commenter concludes that “Zionism is an evil which ‘must be 
erased from the page of time’ to quote Pressident [sic] Ahmadinejad”, while another argues 
that “we stop the Jews and things will settle down”, and yet another describes “Zionist-
Globalist, IMF, Trilateral commission, World Bank, Rothchilds, Rockefellers, Warburgs, J.P. 
Morgan, Goldman Sachs” as “Jews by origin” who “are pure evil” and “should have long 
time ago to be removed.” Another suggests that Jews have more than their share of wealth 
and influence, and argues that a proportion of Jews working in “high finance and media” will 
have to vacate their posts in order to create “equal opportunity for every other group”. 
Just one comment in the small random sample can be said to be truly critical of conspiracy 
fantasy and its accompanying racism. The author of that particular comment observes that 
“[t]here is anti Semitism in many of the comments on here” and argues that the reason this 
goes unnoticed is because hatred of Jews has been normalised. Another commenter questions 
Icke’s tendency towards “think[ing] Israel is horrible”, yet praises him for his “wisdom and 
research”; a third criticises him by stating that US and Zionist “nefariousness” is eclipsed by 
the supposed evil of Islam, which he or she asserts to have “eradicated love and respect in the 
people”. Otherwise, there is only support for the three fantasists and for the claims made in 
their videos. 
5. Conclusion 
Existing research has already established the centrality of antisemitism to conspiracy fantasy, 
highlighted the particular role of the YouTube platform in disseminating such fantasy, and 
found suggestions of a pattern by which the active YouTube audience for conspiracy fantasy 
may respond to latently antisemitic content with explicitly antisemitic comments. The current 
paper adds to this body of knowledge with content analysis of the ten most popular videos by 
each of three well-known conspiracy fantasists and with corpus analysis of the total 
population of comments on all videos by the three. 
While the videos analysed here make accusations against a wide variety of entities, it is Israel 
and the US that are most frequently accused – and it is Jewish-related lexical items that 
predominate in user comments. The west as a whole is portrayed as dominated by a ruthless 
and bloodthirsty elite, whose members are often referred to using racially-charged terms such 
as “Zionists”, “Rothschilds”, or “Rothschild Zionists”. Innovations such as Icke’s “reptilians” 
or Shrimpton’s “DVD” notwithstanding, it thus appears to be the Holocaust-inspiring 
antisemitic tradition that continues to dominate the conspiracy fantasy genre – at least as it is 
expressed by these three particular fantasists, and by the members of the online audience 
which YouTube has enabled them to reach. Two of the three have faced YouTube’s ultimate 
sanction since the time of data collection, but only after years of using the platform to 
broadcast their message of hate. The third remains in place – as do countless others. 
Appendix 
Data was collected from the YouTube API using R v. 3.4.4 with tuber v. 0.9.7 (Sood, 2018). 
Quantitative analysis was carried out using R v. 3.6.1, with visualisations created using 
ggplot2 v. 3.2.1 (see Wickham, 2016). Other notable libraries used include tidytext v. 0.2.2 
(Silge & Robinson, 2016) and stopwords v 1.0 (Benoit, Muhr, & Watanabe, 2019). All three 
lists from the latter were used in filtering out non-lexical words. 
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Figure 1: Number of videos in which each entity, class of entities, or member of class of entities is accused of conspiracy 
(top 10 videos per channel, by popularity) 
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Figure 2: Odds ratios: frequency of appearance of each keyword in the three sub-corpora, as compared to frequency of 
appearance in the reference corpus (95% confidence intervals, full corpus) 
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Table 1: Measures of popularity for conspiracist channels 
Channel Videos Total views Total likes Total dislikes Likes ratio Total comments 
David Icke 641 63629728 935053 49859 19:1 346830 
Ken O’Keefe 221 4064222 121303 4552 27:1 47402 
Richie Allen 204 1369417 
   
20966 
  
Table 2: Number of videos in which each entity, class of entities, or member of class of entities is accused of conspiracy (top 
10 videos per channel, by popularity) 
Accused Videos 
Israel 18 
US 18 
UK 11 
Specific western politicians 9 
EU 8 
Mainstream media (MSM) 8 
Rothschild family 8 
Politicians 7 
Zionists 7 
Satanists 6 
Secret societies 6 
 
 
Table 3: (Sub-)corpus size and length of individual messages (mean, standard deviation, and 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th 
centiles) 
(Sub-)corpus Messages Words M SD 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
David Icke (full) 240248 11163705 46.5 94.2 6 11 22 50 101 
Ken O’Keefe (full) 38921 1856623 47.7 90.7 6 11 24 54 103 
Richie Allen (full) 15960 813240 51.0 97.5 7 13 26 53 107 
David Icke (⩽100 words) 216076 5873596 27.2 23.0 5 10 20 38 63 
Ken O’Keefe (⩽100 words) 34791 1007659 29.0 24.3 6 10 21 41 68 
Richie Allen (⩽100 words) 14197 413765 29.1 22.7 6 12 22 41 64 
Reference (Twitter) 1000001 13211854 13.2 7.6 4 7 12 19 24 
 
 
Table 4: Comments per commenter (mean, standard deviation, and 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th centiles) 
Sub-corpus Commenters Comments M SD 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
David Icke (full) 85325 240248 2.8 7.8 1 1 1 2 5 
Ken O’Keefe (full) 15673 38921 2.5 8.8 1 1 1 2 5 
Richie Allen (full) 3963 15960 4.0 8.3 1 1 2 4 9 
David Icke (⩽100 words) 80318 216076 2.7 7.5 1 1 1 2 5 
Ken O’Keefe (⩽100 words) 14753 34791 2.4 8.2 1 1 1 2 5 
Richie Allen (⩽100 words) 3709 14197 3.8 7.8 1 1 2 3 8 
 
 
Table 5: Words per commenter (mean, standard deviation, and 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th centiles) 
Sub-corpus Commenters Words M SD 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
David Icke (full) 85325 11163705 130.8 488.0 7 15 38 104 265 
Ken O’Keefe (full) 15673 1856623 118.5 422.2 7 16 39 101 251 
Richie Allen (full) 3963 813240 205.2 627.4 10 22 56 161 435 
David Icke (⩽100 words) 80318 5873596 73.1 197.5 7 14 32 74 150 
Ken O’Keefe (⩽100 
words) 
14753 1007659 68.3 223.8 7 15 33 74 140 
Richie Allen (⩽100 words) 3709 413765 111.6 230.2 9 20 45 103 252 
 
 
Table 6: Odds ratios for frequency of appearance of each keyword in the three sub-corpora, as compared to frequency of 
appearance in the reference corpus (95% confidence intervals, full corpus) 
 
Odds ratio 
 
Freq. (per 100 000 lexical words) Icke Allen O’Keefe 
Word Score Ref. Icke Allen O’Keefe Est. Low High Est. Low High Est. Low High 
zionist 1489 0.6 77.4 192.5 368.3 128.0 88.7 191.3 319.4 219.1 490.7 609.7 429.1 893.4 
zionists 1489 0.2 38.8 83.4 125.5 155.1 88.3 299.5 334.8 187.4 669.5 501.0 286.9 1001.5 
rothschild 1466 0.4 37.5 55.3 41.1 81.8 53.8 131.6 121.5 77.1 200.9 89.9 57.9 147.1 
jews 1456 4.1 107.3 219.4 555.1 26.1 22.6 30.3 53.5 45.5 63.4 135.8 117.7 157.2 
governments 1438 1.4 45.1 58.1 51.3 30.9 24.3 39.8 40.0 29.9 53.9 35.3 27.0 46.5 
controlled 1434 2.2 77.9 79.5 68.1 35.2 29.0 43.2 36.1 28.5 46.1 30.9 24.8 38.7 
jewish 1434 3.9 76.5 160.6 268.4 19.3 16.7 22.5 40.6 34.2 48.6 68.0 58.4 79.6 
israel 1433 8.7 144.6 318.8 913.7 16.7 15.1 18.5 36.9 32.7 41.6 106.2 95.9 117.3 
mainstream 1397 2.3 57.2 56.1 38.6 24.3 20.1 29.7 24.0 18.6 30.9 16.4 13.0 20.9 
humanity 1395 4.4 108.1 63.1 134.4 24.2 21.1 28.0 14.2 11.5 17.5 30.2 25.8 35.3 
satan 1392 2.6 79.7 34.3 58.0 30.4 25.4 36.6 13.2 9.9 17.4 22.1 17.9 27.5 
propaganda 1387 3.3 38.9 77.2 91.4 11.6 9.8 13.8 23.1 18.7 28.6 27.3 22.8 32.9 
hitler 1385 2.7 36.0 42.5 78.1 13.1 10.9 15.8 15.6 12.0 20.2 28.4 23.3 34.9 
nations 1383 2.8 35.7 47.5 76.5 12.5 10.5 15.1 16.8 13.0 21.6 26.9 22.1 32.8 
cia 1373 3.0 33.3 86.5 47.4 11.2 9.4 13.4 29.1 23.5 36.2 16.0 12.9 19.7 
 
 
Table 7: Odds ratios: frequency of appearance of each keyword in the three sub-corpora, as compared to frequency of 
appearance in the reference corpus (95% confidence intervals, size-limited corpus with comments of over 100 words 
excluded) 
 
Odds ratio 
 
Freq. (per 100 000 lexical words) Icke Allen O’Keefe 
Word Score Ref. Icke Allen O’Keefe Est. Low High Est. Low High Est. Low High 
zionism 1489 0.1 33.9 79.9 71.4 232.3 112.4 577.4 547.6 257.5 1430.9 497.6 235.3 1276.0 
zionist 1487 0.6 94.1 230.2 379.2 155.6 107.6 233.8 382.6 262.6 572.3 622.8 431.4 954.6 
zionists 1486 0.2 46.9 94.2 139.3 187.6 106.7 366.4 379.4 208.6 763.1 550.9 314.2 1096.1 
nwo 1463 0.5 60.6 42.7 42.8 111.7 75.8 172.4 80.2 49.4 133.7 79.5 51.8 126.7 
rothschild 1461 0.4 39.9 65.7 35.2 87.2 57.0 139.4 144.7 89.9 243.8 77.4 48.5 129.1 
jews 1444 4.1 95.4 265.0 510.2 23.2 20.0 27.1 64.8 54.2 77.7 124.8 107.8 145.5 
israel 1432 8.7 148.1 391.6 1038.1 17.1 15.4 19.0 45.3 39.8 51.8 120.8 108.9 134.3 
controlled 1422 2.2 80.9 85.4 61.4 36.6 30.0 45.1 39.0 29.6 51.4 27.9 21.8 35.8 
governments 1420 1.4 41.4 51.4 49.3 28.4 22.2 36.9 35.7 25.2 50.8 34.0 25.4 45.9 
jewish 1420 3.9 72.5 176.4 216.2 18.3 15.7 21.5 44.7 36.7 54.6 54.7 46.5 64.8 
puppet 1415 1.7 41.1 54.6 73.8 23.5 18.7 29.9 31.6 22.7 44.0 42.4 32.8 55.2 
mainstream 1389 2.3 64.4 64.9 38.6 27.4 22.5 33.5 27.9 20.7 37.3 16.5 12.6 21.6 
satan 1374 2.6 71.4 38.0 51.4 27.2 22.6 32.9 14.7 10.4 20.7 19.7 15.4 25.1 
propaganda 1371 3.3 36.3 79.1 96.9 10.8 9.1 13.0 23.8 18.4 30.7 29.0 23.8 35.3 
hitler 1370 2.7 38.8 38.0 80.3 14.1 11.7 17.2 14.1 9.9 19.7 29.3 23.6 36.5 
 
 
 
